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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
October 27, 2018, was an unfathomable day. Within the tran-
quility of the Squirrel Hill neighborhood in Pittsburgh, Pennsylva-
nia, one of the deadliest attacks on the Jewish community in the
United States had taken place. For nothing more than their faith,
a remorseless white supremacist stripped eleven members of the
Tree of Life Synagogue of their lives.1 After twenty-two years in the
FBI, special agent Robert Jones called this the “most horrific crime
scene” that he had ever witnessed.2 Though unfathomable, this
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event was the culmination of a steady increase in violence against
Jews. In 2017, FBI data revealed that there was a “37 percent spike
in anti-Semitic attacks.”3 Indeed, just six months later, another
shooting took place at Chabad of Poway Synagogue near San Diego.4
The shooter was a nineteen-year-old male declaring that Jews
sought to “doom” the white race and that the Pittsburgh synagogue
shooting inspired him.5 As the shock settles, the nation’s conscious-
ness has been awakened and left wondering why there has been
such a sudden burst of inexplicable hatred towards this particular
group of people.
One possibility is that history is circular and humans have a
tendency not to learn from their past once it seems too far removed.
The Jewish people have suffered continuous oppression despite com-
prising an incredibly small proportion—approximately 0.2 percent—
of the world’s population.6 The Holocaust during World War II
stands as the most horrific example as it resulted in the death of an
estimated six million Jews.7 Despite the atrocities of the Holocaust
being well-documented, recent studies have revealed that one-third
of Americans do not believe that six million Jews died.8 Moreover,
among millennials, twenty-two percent had never heard of (or were
unsure if they had heard of) the Holocaust, and two-thirds did not
3. Gina Cherelus, U.S. Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes Spiked 37 Percent in 2017: FBI,
REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-hate-crimes-report/u-s
-anti-semitic-hate-crimes-spiked-37-percent-in-2017-fbi-idUSKCN1NI2H6 [https://perma
.cc/N6JQ-3N5L] (noting an increase from 684 to 938 anti-Semitic incidents in 2017); see
also Laurie Goodstein, ‘There is Still So Much Evil’: Growing Anti-Semitism Stuns
American Jews, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/us/anti
-semitism-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/M28J-TEH4] (noting a fifty-seven percent increase
in anti-Semitic incidents in the United States).
4. Ray Sanchez & Artemis Moshtaghian, Mayor Says Synagogue Shooting in Cali-
fornia that Left 1 dead and 3 Wounded was a ‘Hate Crime’, CNN (Apr. 28, 2019, 12:43 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/27/us/san-diego-synagogue/index.html [https://perma.cc
/NQ49-3A4B].
5. Poway Synagogue Shooting Captured on Video, Prosecutors say, as They Describe
Attack, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me
-san-diego-synagogue-shooter-camera-explainer-john-earnest-20190502-story.html
[https://perma.cc/3VDC-Z5SF].
6. As of 2018, there are just 13.9 million Jews within the world’s population of 7.8
billion people. Current World Population, WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info
/world-population [https://perma.cc/Z5UV-UVAV] (last accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
7. Raffi Berg, The Holocaust: Who are the Missing Million?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39062221 [https://perma.cc/3SKM-82SC].
8. David Brennan, One-Third of Americans Don’t Believe 6 Million Jews Were
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know what Auschwitz was.9 In the context of this ignorance, mis-
placed hatred brews quickly.
Targeted hatred is also bolstered by the manner in which humans
categorize on the basis of race. Jews are a vastly diverse group of
people that in many ways escape categorization altogether. Being
“Jewish” does not mean the same thing for each individual identifying
as such. Jews are not unified by religion alone. They are also unified
by elements of ethnicity, culture, ancestry, nationality, race, and a
shared history of prejudice. In the United States, sixty-two percent of
Jews say that being Jewish is primarily about ancestry and culture,
while only fifteen percent say that it is about religion.10 In addition to
the varying ways in which Jews identify themselves, there is also
much confusion underlying how others perceives Jews. In Concerning
the Jews, Mark Twain pondered how “[a]ll things are mortal but the
Jew; all other forces pass, but he remains. What is the secret of his
immortality?”11 Russian author, Leo Tolstoy, also marveled at the
Jewish identity, asking, “What is the Jew? . . . What kind of unique
creature is this whom all the rulers of all the nations of the world
have disgraced and crushed and expelled and destroyed . . . and who,
despite their anger and their fury, continues to live and to flour-
ish.”12 Given the vast array of internal and external perspectives,
the Jewish identity is one continually fraught within a whirlwind of
intrigue and clashing perceptions.
Today, being Jewish is usually viewed as a religion or ethnicity.
But it was not always this way. Until the late 1990s in the Soviet
Union, being “Jewish” (pronounced Yevrei in Russian) was regarded
as one’s nationality on internal passports—the equivalent of per-
sonal identification papers like a driver’s license.13 It did not matter
whether one actually practiced Judaism, belonged to a synagogue,
9. Julie Zauzmer, Two-Thirds of Millennials Don’t Know What Auschwitz Is, Holocaust
Study Says, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion
/kids-don’t-know-about-the-holocaust-because-schools-are-pre-occupied-with-social-jus
tice [https://perma.cc/H42A-JYJV] (Aushwitz was the largest concentration camp in Nazi
Germany where over one million Jews lost their lives).
10. A Portrait of Jewish Americans, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.pew
forum.org/2013/10/01/jewish-american-beliefs-attitudes-culture-survey [https://perma.cc
/UN4Q-ULWU].
11. Mark Twain, Concerning The Jews, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MARK TWAIN
249 (1899) (published in Harper’s Magazine).
12. Leo Tolstoy, What is the Jew?, in THE FINAL RESOLUTION 189 (1908) (originally
printed in Jewish World Periodical as retrieved from Misha Galperin, Hating Leo Tolstoy,
E-JEWISH PHIL. (Dec. 6, 2015), https://ejewishphilanthropy.com/haying-leo-tolstoy [https://
perma.cc/WQT5-GC4E]).
13. Moshe Decter, The Status of the Jews in the Soviet Union, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Jan. 1, 1963), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1963-01-01/stat
us-jews-soviet-union [https://perma.cc/NGR6-3AVP].
528 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:525
or spoke Hebrew.14 Rather, it was just a means of creating the “other”
or an “outsider” group and ensuring that there was no real means
of escaping the mark.
While in Russia being Jewish was a nationality, in the United
States it was long seen as a race.15 Under the chief antidiscrimination
federal law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, courts have
found that Jews are protected on the basis of “race.”16 On one hand,
this can be regarded as a beneficial approach since it extends
protections against discrimination.17 On the other, it may play into
white supremacist views of Jews as members of an inferior race.18
This particular distinction illuminates the double-edged sword of
categorization and underscores the manner in which constructed
groupings mobilize hatred from extremist movements.
Even in countries that are seemingly welcome to all, immigrants
continue to be marked as “other” because of a variety of characteris-
tics such as accent, gesture, and the color of their skin.19 And being
racially “white” is not just about phenotype, ancestry, or upward
mobility in society. Whiteness is a delicate performance, and entry
into this dance is never guaranteed. What defines one’s race is al-
ways in flux, and who has the power to define it is subject to the
hierarchy of race.20 It is for this reason that the nature of race is
paradoxical: it is simultaneously flexibly fluid and immutably innate.
This Article delves into the power of identity and perception as
a means of unveiling the role of choice in race. The American citizenry
is growing increasingly diverse, with a “white minority” projected by
2045.21 At the same time, racism is viewed as a major problem by more
than six in ten Americans.22 While this Article does not purport to
14. Id.
15. RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 487 (Juan F.
Perea et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter RACE AND RACES].
16. Michael Kunzelman, Judge: Jewish Heritage Can be Basis for Race Discrimination,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 16, 2018), https://apnews.com/82c5075c54ce4f179e6517f0e4f0
7824 [https://perma.cc/Q8CD-2ZA4].
17. Id.
18. See Brian Levin, Why White Supremacist Attacks Are on the Rise, Even in Surpris-
ing Places, TIME (Mar. 21, 2019), http://time.com/5555396/white-supremacist-attacks-rise
-new-zealand [https://perma.cc/76XM-LTJ2] (noting that the white nationalist movement
“is being globalized at a very rapid pace” across many countries).
19. See, e.g., MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EURO-
PEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1999).
20. Id.
21. William H. Frey, The US will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045, Census Projects,
BROOKINGS (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the
-us-will-become-minority-white-in-2045-census-projects [https://perma.cc/UH6G-HBDK].
22. Eugene Scott, Most Americans Say Race Relations are a Major Problem, but Few
Discuss it with Friends and Family, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/05/31/most-americans-say-race-relations-are-a-major
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discover an antidote to racism, it strives to take a tangible step to
better inform how race is understood by focusing on the disconnect
that often arises because of the fluidity of race.23 We are in the midst
of a time where the protection of racial minorities is especially vital,
and where individuals are grappling with conflicting notions of “race”
due to the increased visibility of white supremacy, DNA ancestry tests,
and focus upon self-identification. Consequently, Part I illuminates
the deliberate construction of race and the racial hierarchy in Amer-
ica’s pursuit of territorial expansion, systemic oppression, and political
gain. Part II, then offers a historical perspective on how American law
developed a dynamic yet vague understanding of race, and peers into
the inconsistencies across judicial opinions wherein judges struggled
to construe race vis-à-vis congressional intent.
Having established the foundation upon which race has been
built in America, Part III addresses how the race that an individual
identifies with is not always in alignment with the race that the
external world perceives them as.24 Although perception is not truly
reality, when it comes to race, external perception can override one’s
self-identity.25 This variance between identity and perception pres-
ents a direct challenge to how racial identities have been catego-
rized, collected, and protected.26 Accordingly, Part III suggests that
courts embrace a more holistic and nuanced approach within claims
of discrimination on the basis of color, and proposes that the U.S. Cen-
sus Survey ask individuals both what race they personally identify
with and what race they are perceived as.
I. THE CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF RACE
The practice of categorization has long been a perplexing one
among scholars.27 On one hand, categorization is an inherent in-
stinct acquired from animals that use it as a means of identifying
-problem-but-few-discuss-it-with-friends-and-family/?utm_term=.1429bc4027eb [https://
perma.cc/T7WU-DAM5].
23. This Article uses the concept of “racial fluidity” as a means to underscore the
context-dependent nature of race rather than the rejection of race altogether. Although
“race” is a human-made social construct, the harmful effects of a “color blind” society (see
discussion of Brazil in Section I.B infra) push against advocating for the removal of race
from our discourse altogether.
24. See, e.g., Erin Cooley, Jazmin L. Brown-Iannuzzi, Darren Agboh, Brian Enjaian,
et al., The Fluid Perception of Racial Identity: The Role of Friendship Groups, 9 SOC’Y.
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 32, 32 (2017).
25. See infra Part III.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Rupert Brown et al., Automatic Category Activation and Social Behaviour:
The Moderating Role of Prejudiced Beliefs, 21 SOC. COGNITION 167, 167–72 (2003);
Patricia M. Gonzales, Hart Blanton & Kevin J. Williams, The Effects of Stereotype Threat
and Double-Minority Status on the Test Performance of Latino Women, 28 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 659, 659–70 (2002).
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and distinguishing between predators and non-predators.28 On the
other, categorization is a deeply problematic means of essentializing
race. Racial essentialism assumes that race reflects an individual’s
“underlying essence,” such as disposition, character, and physiol-
ogy.29 Yet, geneticists have made it perfectly clear that there is no
scientific basis for race.30 Thus, although it makes little sense to
draw generalizations on the basis of race while ignoring nuance and
diversity, society has continued to do so for centuries.31
While categorization is not a uniquely American problem, the
manner in which it has evolved (or perhaps, more aptly, devolved)
in the United States has enabled the reoccurrence of insidious
eruptions within race relations. Arguably, “[t]here is not a country
in world history in which racism has been more important, for so long
a time, as the United States.”32 While the black-white “color line” re-
mains pervasive, the construction of the racial hierarchy has proven
to be yet another thorn thrust deeply into America’s race relations.33
Part I thus explores the process of how the black-white binary and
the racial hierarchy were deliberately constructed in America to
serve concrete purposes—from using slavery to fulfill labor demands
to applying colonial rhetoric to justify territorial expansion.
A. Race & Rhetoric: Justifications for Slavery and American
Imperialism
The institution of slavery slowly chipped away at the American
conscience by systematically constructing racism as an antidote to
the depravity and immorality of the institution. In cultivating “that
28. See Douglas P. Chivers, Mark I. McCormick, Matthew D. Mitchell, Ryan A.
Ramasamy & Maud C. O. Ferrari, Background Level or Risk Determines How Prey
Categorize Predators and Non-Predators, 281 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1, 1–5 (2014).
29. See Melody Manchi Chao, Ying-yi Hong & Chi-yue Chiu, Essentializing Race: Its
Implications on Racial Categorization, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 619, 619,
621 (2013) (“By construing race as a meaningful entity with inferential potential, racial
essentialism heightens the relevance of race in making social judgment.”).
30. Elizabeth Kolbert, There’s No Scientific Basis for Race—It’s a Made-Up Label,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/04
/race-genetics-science-africa [https://perma.cc/Z478-VQWC].
31. Nicholas Hudson, From “Nation to “Race”: The Origin of Racial Classification in
Eighteenth-Century Thought, 29 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUDS. 247, 247–48 (1996)
(“Historians of science and anthropology have often noted that the idea of race began to
emerge at some point in the eighteenth century, particularly in the work of Linnaeus
and of authors who advocated polygenist theories of human origin.”).
32. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1492–PRESENT 23
(1980).
33. The manifestation of the “racial hierarchy” is discussed in Part I, whereas its
implications are explored in Part II.
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special racial feeling—whether hatred, or contempt, or pity, or patron-
ization,” slavery relayed a sense of black inferiority and the “deroga-
tory thought we call racism.”34 Even as other countries abolished
slavery, the United States sought to retain it.35 From the outset, white
settlers found themselves in desperate need of labor.36 To fill their
labor needs, the settlers realized that importing African slaves would
be easier than enslaving Indians or other whites.37 The exploitable
vulnerability of Africans was rooted in their relative lack of military
power to thwart the guns and ships that came for them.38 Moreover,
unlike immigrants that made an active choice to move, Africans
were “torn from their land and culture” and forced into a country
where their voices were entirely silenced.39 Of note, however, was
that despite their differences, enslaved blacks and poor free white
workers viewed one another as equals and formed strong bonds at
the onset of their labor relations.40 Unsurprisingly, the southern
states immediately put an end to this fraternization by enacting
laws that provided whites with financial advantages.41 In this sense,
there was nothing “natural” about racism; it did not emerge organi-
cally. Rather, racism required active efforts to construct whiteness
as superior through the creation of an economic gap that made
racial division more tangible.42
In its original form, the United States Constitution was suffused
with race and demonstrated the centrality of black slavery in devel-
oping American jurisprudence.43 Indeed, the Constitution blatantly
accommodated and protected slavery, counting slaves as “three fifths
of all other Persons”44 for the purposes of representation in Con-
gress. In so doing, the clause allowed southern slaveholding states
(which had a smaller white population than the northern free states)
to exert a disproportionate influence upon the U.S. government lead-
ing up to the Civil War.45 Intriguingly, despite the Constitution’s overt
34. ZINN, supra note 32, at 23.
35. While Britain abolished slavery in 1834 and France abolished it in 1848, the
Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution banning slavery did not come until
1865. See KEVIN BALES, NEW SLAVERY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 55–68 (2d ed. 2004).
36. ZINN, supra note 32, at 24.
37. Id. at 23–25.
38. Id. at 26.
39. Id. at 26.
40. Id. at 31.
41. Id. at 56–57.
42. ZINN, supra note 32, at 38.
43. RACE AND RACES, supra note 15, at 104.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
45. Malik Simba, The Three-Fifths Clause of the United States Constitution (1787),
BLACKPAST (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/events
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safeguards for slavery, the drafters did not use the word “slave.”46
In a heated debate in the House of Representatives, one Congressman
proclaimed that “it would be better not to stain the Constitutional
code with such a term, since . . . the same sense was conveyed by the
circuitous expression of ‘three fifths of all other persons.’”47 On one
hand, this suggests that even early on in history, men regarded
slavery as an ugly “stain.” On the other, it exposes the cruelly coded
and “circuitous” language that was baked into the Constitution. Thus,
despite attempts at subtlety, the Constitution’s framework was
inherently imbued with racist undertones.
America’s gravitation towards stratifying race through slavery
served as an ideal primer for its imperialist ambitions to establish
an “American Empire” during the late 1800s and early 1900s.
Marked by Europe’s “Scramble for Africa” beginning in the 1870s,
the third wave of colonialism (New Imperialism) influenced Amer-
ica’s approach to territorial expansion as well as its overarching
desire to become a global power.48 During this imperial period, the
federal government developed a distinct, yet familiar, relationship
between the American body politic and the inhabitants of the new
overseas possessions.49 In effect, America came to incorporate its
relegation of the African race “to a status of second-class citizen-
ship” within its new territories.50 In 1898, the United States signed
the Treaty of Paris with Spain to establish Puerto Rico as one of its
acquisitions.51 Article IX of the Treaty declared that “[t]he civil
rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Con-
gress.”52 In so doing, the Treaty made “no promise of citizenship . . .
nor any promise, actual or implied, of statehood.”53 A year later,
Congress enacted the Foraker Act of 1900 to mark Puerto Rico as a
separate nationality from the United States.54 The Act established
Puerto Rico’s governance and regulation, and did not provide a
Puerto Rican seat (or vote) in the U.S. House of Representatives.55
-african-american-history/three-fifths-clause-united-states-constitution-1787 [https://
perma.cc/5CJF-CX2B].
46. RACE AND RACES, supra note 15, at 107.
47. Id.
48. Getachew Mengistie & Michael Blakeney, Geographical Indications and the
Scramble for Africa, 25 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 199, 199 (2017).
49. RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM 15 (1972).
50. Id.
51. Treaty of Peace with Spain (Treaty of Paris), U.S.-Spain, art. II, Dec. 10, 1898,
30 Stat. 1754.
52. Id. art. 9.
53. JOSE A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 20 (1979).
54. Foraker Act of 1900, c. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
55. Id.
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The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in Downes
v. Bidwell, underscoring that “[a] false step at this time might be
fatal to the development of what Chief Justice Marshall called the
American Empire.”56 Justice Harlan vigorously dissented, arguing
that the law must be uniform across all territories and that Con-
gress fundamentally lacked the power to ignore constitutional
provisions “under special or embarrassing circumstances.”57 Despite
Justice Harlan’s reasonable and textual interpretation of the Consti-
tution, the Court’s majority was well aware that the federal govern-
ment had a different preoccupation—an ideology of imperialist
expansion that ought not be deterred or infringed upon at any cost.58
America’s imperialist approach hinged upon an implicit under-
standing that Puerto Ricans were inferior because of their ethnic
and racial diversity.59 The government justified its “outright inter-
vention in the internal affairs” through a so-called “vision of order”
that fixated upon “stability as the cornerstone of progress.”60 This
rhetoric focusing upon the inhabitants’ disarray served as a means
of couching racism within political speech.61 Even when the Jones
Act of 1917 naturalized Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizen, Congress ve-
hemently challenged the extent of the rights provided and ulti-
mately cabined its reach.62 Senator Foraker emphasized that the Act
was merely intended to recognize that Puerto Rico belonged to the
United States rather than any individual rights for its inhabitants.63
Meanwhile, members of Congress vocalized their concern that Puerto
Ricans were ill-suited for citizenship because of their “mixed racial
character and the tropical climate of their birth.”64 Despite these
rather odd concerns, the Supreme Court agreed. In Balzac v. People
of Porto Rico, the Court determined that the Constitution’s guaran-
tee of the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment did not
extend to Puerto Ricans.65 The Court found that it was Congress’
intent to leave the Puerto Rican people with the power to decide
whether they wished to adopt “this institution of Anglo-Saxon
56. 182 U.S. 244, 286 (1901).
57. Id. at 384–85 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 286–87.
59. RACE AND RACES, supra note 15, at 358.
60. Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The
Insular Cases (1901–1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 288 (1996).
61. Id.
62. Puerto Rico, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://
history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/HAIC/Historical-Essays/Foreign-Domes
tic/Puerto-Rico [https://perma.cc/7KN7-36CR] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
63. RACE AND RACES, supra note 15, at 357.
64. Id. at 358.
65. 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922).
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origin, and when.”66 While it may seem that the Court was merely
being “sedulous to avoid forcing a jury system” upon Puerto Ricans,
the reality was that the Court viewed them as part of an inferior
civilization, “living in compact and ancient communities.”67 Together,
the legislature and judiciary made unmistakably clear the sharp
divide between the white Anglo-Saxons and the racially mixed
Puerto Ricans.
Even as late as 1950, little changed in America’s relationship
with Puerto Rico. Although Puerto Rico was eventually declared a
“Commonwealth” of the United States, this was nothing more than
yet another “euphemism for the term ‘colony.’”68 Indeed, Puerto Rico
was subjected to an ongoing shift in legal status that left its “politi-
cal spectrum in a state of turmoil.”69 The tactic of fluctuation and
inconsistency inflicted upon America’s “colonials” was in direct (and
deliberate) contrast to its grandiose vision of order and balance for
itself.70 By continually leaving Puerto Ricans in disarray, America
cultivated its power as the colonizing master and reinforced control
over the territory.71 Thus, while slavery was abolished in 1865, Amer-
ica’s desire to assert its dominance over a race it deemed inferior
persisted long after.
In the same year as the Treaty of Paris, the United States also
signed the Newlands Resolution to acquire Hawaii as one of its ter-
ritories.72 Although the timing was similar, the ultimate fates of these
two “colonial” realms differed substantially because of the impact of
the insidious nature of racism.73 Undeniably, the manner in which
Hawaii became a territory was fraught with the erosion of the in-
digenous monarchy as well as the suppression of Hawaiian natives
and the cheapening of their culture.74 However, America’s longer
history with and physical presence in Hawaii enabled it to assimi-
late more fully than it did in Puerto Rico. For example, during the
66. Id. at 310.
67. Id. at 310–11.
68. RACE AND RACES, supra note 15, at 361.
69. EDIBERTO ROMAN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES 144 (2006).
70. Ramos, supra note 60, at 288.
71. Id. at 290–91.
72. Newlands Resolution, 30 Stat. 750 (1898) (codified as 40 U.S.C. § 661 (1940)).
73. One might wonder why two similarly situated lands would have disparate out-
comes under the same imperial power, but this is not the first such example. During the
rise of Nazi Germany, countries like France that protected and offered citizenship to
Jews in Europe readily allowed their persecution and internment in the context of its
colonies in North Africa. MEHNAZ M. AFRIDI, THE ROLE OF MUSLIMS AND THE HOLOCAUST
5 (2014), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935420.001.00
01/oxfordhb-9780199935420-e-005?print=pdf.
74. HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY
IN HAWAI’I 3 (rev. ed. 1993).
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1880s, American sugar and pineapple companies in Hawaii sought
to limit voting rights to wealthy individuals of select ethnicities, and
ultimately staged a coup (with the help of the U.S. government) to
overthrow Hawaiian royalty altogether.75 Following this pivotal
inflection point, America began to actively exert its “whitening” in-
fluence upon Hawaii—politically, linguistically, and culturally.76
Yet, even with America’s assimilation into a prospering Hawaii,
members of Congress resisted the admission of Hawaii as a State
because of its racially and ethnically diverse population.77 It was not
until the composition of Congress changed drastically to a majority
of northern, liberal Democrats that Hawaii gained statehood.78 Today,
sixty years after Hawaii became a State, a similarly radical shift
would have to take place in Congress in order for Puerto Rico to
gain statehood.79 When looked at through the lens of America’s am-
bitions, the outcomes within and outside of its territories become
more straightforward. In order to effectuate its goals of increased
domestic power and territorial expansion, America constructed racism
as a tool to justify and obfuscate its inferior treatment of races it
deemed as “the other.”
B. Dominance Through Division: The Racial Hierarchy’s Ultimate
Illusion
While the creation of the black-white binary may have been suf-
ficient to maintain America’s labor needs and justify colonialist
pursuits, it could not adequately account for the entire spectrum of
races that America regularly interfaced with. As a result, the con-
struction of a “racial hierarchy” emerged as a useful tool for accom-
modating numerous racial identities. The key premise within the
hierarchy is that some races are superior to others and are therefore
entitled to more rights and privileges. However, despite being more
encompassing than a binary, the hierarchy still maintains an overly
simplistic notion of race that propagates ignorance and racism. By
arbitrarily ordering humans into differing races and deeming some
inferior or superior relative to others, the hierarchy goes beyond the
75. Jesse Greenspan, Hawai’i Monarchy Overthrown with U.S. Support, 120 Years
Ago, HISTORY (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.history.com/news/hawaiis-monarchy-over
thrown-with-u-s-support-120-years-ago [https://perma.cc/46XK-6Y9H].
76. TRASK, supra note 74, at 18.
77. WESTON, supra note 49, at 65.
78. David Stebenne, The Political Dealmaking That Finally Brought Hawaii
Statehood, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June 15, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history
/what-puerto-rico-learn-hawaii-180963690 [https://perma.cc/SMK8-467F].
79. As discussed in Section I.B, infra, the effects of the racial hierarchy would likely
exert a disproportionately negative effect upon Puerto Ricans as opposed to Hawaiians
because of elements like skin color and cultural assimilation.
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noxiousness of categorization by flattening the contents of the boxed
racial identities into competing (and continually shifting) one-di-
mensional tiers.
The racial hierarchy creates the toxic illusion that elevation to
a higher tier is possible. But, this process of elevation is artificial as
it occurs by virtue of lowering other races. The horrendous irony is
that in this contentious battle to get ahead within the hierarchy, the
fundamental problem—the hierarchy itself—becomes obscured. The
jarring and racially charged response to the People v. Hall decision
exemplified precisely this obfuscation.80 After the California Su-
preme Court held that no one could use Chinese testimony in a
criminal trial against a white defendant, Lai Chun-Chuen, a Chinese
merchant, proclaimed that the Chinese should not be subject to the
same treatment as Indians who “know nothing about the relations
of society[,] . . . know no mutual respect [and] . . . live in wild places
and in caves.”81 Lai’s tactic of differentiation may have been an out-
burst of unfiltered rage, but it illustrates the tensions among racial
groups in the late 1800s. And although Lai is but one voice, he em-
bodies the devastating and potentially fatal impact of racism upon
efforts to unify and propel civil rights.
Although viewing strategies in retrospect has its limits, critiquing
strategies of the past provides insight into how to improve those of
the future. If the hegemonic race imposes a category upon a particu-
lar race, one way of reclaiming power is to disrupt that very catego-
rization. Dominance thrives when division is rampant—division
enables the dominant group to appear invincibly strong and united.
Nevertheless, if power is gained by division, then it can be lost by
union amongst the fractured. As historian and activist Vine Deloria,
Jr. puts it, “preoccupation with race obscure[s] the real issues.”82 For
example, “[b]y defining the problem as one of race and making race
refer solely to black, Indians were systematically excluded from con-
sideration.”83 Likewise, in limiting civil rights issues to a black-white
dichotomy, Native Americans, Asians, and other “non-white” immi-
grants were left without a point of entry into the battle to dismantle
the hierarchy.84 In this sense, limiting those that are included within
the oppressed race traps those excluded in a liminal space along the
spectrum of race, oscillating between white, non-white, black, semi-
black, or “a subcategory of black.”85 Moreover, this exclusionary
80. See 4 Cal. 399, 399 (1854).
81. CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 22 (1994).
82. VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 168 (1988).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 170.
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approach makes it difficult to isolate the relevant issues of each
group, as well as the crucial differences across groups.86 Ultimately,
a narrow conception of what races “count” in the fight for civil rights
results in a disorienting cacophony of identity politics that obscures
the issues common to racially oppressed minorities.
In the midst of the rush to reposition a race and claim greater
entitlement to rights and privileges than others, the precise aims of
the hierarchy are attained: stratification, creation of categories, and
hostility bred across groups.87 After Hall, racial groups could have
been unified by their struggles—arbitrary categorization, systemic
discrimination, and fundamentally unequal treatment in the United
States. Nevertheless, instead of recognizing the shared interests
and collaborating, the fracture among the races grew both deeper
and wider.
Critically, the solution to the overarching dilemma is not to
create a homogenous, all-encompassing whole that erases distinct
racial identities. Indeed, by envisioning a utopian model wherein
race is not a meaningful difference, communities become diluted and
their voice is disenfranchised.88 As evidenced by the race relations
in Brazil, a color-blind culture where a cloud of silence envelopes
racism does not lead to harmony. Brazil’s “racial democracy” is built
upon the notion of a racially fluid society.89 The country boasts a
spectrum of races and skin tones with forty-seven percent of the
population being mixed race and one third of marriages occurring
across racial boundaries.90 Yet, the top one percent of Brazil’s econ-
omy is eighty percent white, whereas the bottom ten percent is
seventy-five percent mixed-race or black.91 Despite the stark divide
and inequity, racism remains obscured by the racial democracy.
By pretending that there is no disparity and that categories are
meaningless, the racial democracy silences stifles public discourse
and debate and enables “a hierarchy based on skin color . . . to
86. Id. at 170–71.
87. Kazuo Seiyama & Jackie Miyasaka, The Modern Stratification System and its
Transformation, 30 INT. J. SOCIOLOGY, 7, 14–16 (2000).
88. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 18 (1991) (“[T]he technique of nonrecognition ultimately supports the supremacy
of white interests.”).
89. Rebecca Reichmann, Introduction to RACE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL: FROM
INDIFFERENCE TO INEQUALITY 1, 1–7 (Rebecca Reichmann ed., 1999) (underscoring that
Brazil’s racial democracy is a myth that denies the existence of racism).
90. Maria Carolina Tomas, Interracial Marriage in Brazil: A Discussion About Local
Marriage Market, Parents’ Characteristics, and Household Chores (Fall 2012) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkley).
91. Cleuci de Oliveira, Is Neymar Black? Brazil and the Painful Relativity of Race,
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/opinion/is-neymar
-black-brazil-and-the-painful-relativity-of-race.html [https://perma.cc/PE29-KYFT].
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congeal.”92 In other words, ignoring the existence of race results in
the dissemination of implicit racism on the basis of external factors
like skin color. Thus, instead of “color-blindness” towards race, the
path away from the hierarchy’s toxicity requires the recognition of
heterogeneity and the nuance within and between individuals.
C. Ensnared Elevation: The Plight of Races Deemed Superior
The ill-conceived racial hierarchy and its subtle yet sinister
effects continue to control all those captured within in. Since the
construction of “whiteness” throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, the hierarchical structure has served as an enabling patina
to enable those classified as white to rise to the top.93 The creation
of this tiered stratification has certainly had immense consequences
upon those deemed Black, mixed, Indian, Asian, or simply “the
other.”94 In analyzing the economic mobility of twenty million In-
dian, Asian, White, Black, and Hispanic American children that are
now in their thirties, research from the U.S. Census Bureau and a
Harvard-based policy group reveals that across all income levels,
race restricts economic opportunity and exerts a far greater influ-
ence than any other factor.95 The near uniformity of economic out-
comes by race is staggering, with only the Asian and Caucasian
races demonstrating growth and mobility.96 This economic inequity
is unsurprising as American society has been constructed to create
imbalance and disparity that benefit the “superior” races while
marginalizing the rest.97 Yet, despite the privileges that come with
“whiteness,” hierarchical thinking has also had a perversely toxic
(and deluding) effect upon both white individuals and the Asian
“model minority.”98
With projections that the United States will become “minority
white” by 2045, the fragility and volatility of whiteness has taken
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See supra Sections I.A and B.
95. Aria Bendix, Striking Maps Show How Race Keeps Kids from Climbing the





98. Bernadette Lim, “Model Minority” Seems Like a Compliment, But It Does Great
Harm, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/10/16
/the-effects-of-seeing-asian-americans-as-a-model-minority/model-minority-seems-like-a
-compliment-but-it-does-great-harm [https://perma.cc/SGX9-DHN8].
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center stage.99 In the U.S., the two greatest risk factors for suicide
are being white and male.100 In spite of the institutions built to
afford white men immense privilege, their placement at the top of
the racial hierarchy subjects them to impossible standards and the
pressure of preserving masculinity and whiteness.101 And so, as it
has become increasingly difficult to claim the superiority of white-
ness, retaliatory and reactionary fear have arisen. The reincarna-
tion of the alt-right, white-supremacist movement and the drastic
spikes in racially motivated crimes are no coincidence.102 And as
diversity continues to grow, the perceived “threat” to whiteness may
only bolster violence and oppression.
The United States has also made concerted efforts to differenti-
ate across minority races. Asian Americans have been deemed the
“model minority,” but the term has been subject to appropriation by
both sides of the political spectrum.103 On one hand, Asians are
portrayed as a hard-working group that does not rely on welfare or
handouts like other immigrants and minorities.104 On the other,
Asians are viewed as a group that is willing to embrace a welfare
system that benefits other minorities more than them.105 With the
latter view, Asians are part of the “multicultural river washing white
hegemony away.”106 Regardless of which characterization is wielded,
the reality remains that the “Asian-American” group is in itself an
American construction. Asian Americans are not a homogeneous
group. There is a rich diversity of ethnic subgroups that vary
drastically in terms of economic and educational attainment.107 For
instance, a vast array of Asian Americans stands to benefit from
affirmative action.108 While eighty-five percent of Mongolian and
99. Frey, supra note 21.
100. Philip Perry, This May be responsible for the high suicide rate among white,
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Taiwanese Americans attend college, only fifteen percent of Bhuta-
nese Americans and thirty-four percent of Burmese Americans do.109
This example alone demonstrates a pressing need to disaggregate
data when analyzing trends within a racial group. Thus, despite
clear disparities within a group, when generalizations are superim-
posed through the construction of race, difference becomes obscured.
II. IN SEARCH OF CLARITY: DECONSTRUCTING
RACE IN THE COURTROOM
The American legal system does not exist in a vacuum. Rather,
the law is inextricably linked to the society it governs, and the
equitability and justice it provides are contingent upon the power
structures in play. Although courts have a role in the protection of
minorities and are relatively insulated from politics, courts continue
to adhere to the status quo set by the legislature, executive, and
societal consensus.110 The judiciary’s multifaceted role therefore
becomes particularly strained when the topic of race comes before
it. At least in part, this is because America’s relationship with race
is a perplexing one.111 And while there is no precise or absolute way
to quantify how much race has influenced the law, the immense im-
pact that it has had in shaping the American legal system is difficult
to ignore. Part II thus explores the manner in which the judiciary
grappled with racism, wavered in its definition of race apropos con-
gressional intent, and ultimately came to recognize the double-edged
clout and complexity of race as a category.
A. Endorsing Racism
In a series of nineteenth century cases, U.S. courts made artful
attempts to obscure the magnitude of race in the justice system
before ultimately endorsing outright racism. In State v. John Mann,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina sought to avoid the issue of
how slaves could permissibly be treated.112 To do so, Judge Ruffin
determined that “[t]he power of the master must be absolute, to
render the submission of the slave perfect,” while acknowledging
109. Sylvia Guan, Gaps in the Debate About Asian Americans and Affirmative Action
at Harvard, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.americanprogress
.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2018/08/29/455316/gaps-debate-asian-ameri
cans-affirmative-action-harvard [https://perma.cc/79NZ-PMUQ].
110. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162,
1162–65 (1977).
111. See supra Part I.
112. 13 N.C. 263, 268 (1829).
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that “as a principle of moral right” this notion should be repudiated.113
Intriguingly, Judge Ruffin felt that “in conscience the law might
properly interfere” with “cruelty and deliberate barbarity,” but that
in truth, the rights of the slave-master could not be brought before
courts.114 In doing so, the Court dejectedly disclaimed “the power of
changing the relation, in which these parts of our people stand to
each other,” and punted to the legislature.115
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
showed no reluctance in declaring the federal Fugitive Slave Act of
1793—which guaranteed slaveholders a right to recover escaped
slaves—constitutional and granting it an expansive interpreta-
tion.116 Although Prigg did not preclude a state from forbidding its
officials to cooperate in the return of a slave, state laws could not
interfere with a slaveholder’s right to enter into another state to
recapture their slave via private action.117 Beyond this pronounce-
ment of federalism, the Court underscored that “we have not the
slightest hesitation in holding . . . [that] the owner of a slave is
clothed with entire authority.”118 This was certainly a holding that
sought to solidify federalism and assert the power of the federal
government during the country’s early beginnings.119 Even so, how-
ever, the Court continued to underscore the absolute power of the
slave master without explicitly mentioning race or color.120
While the aforementioned cases are indicative of the reluctance
of courts to rule against slaveholders, they do not rise to the level of
outright racism displayed by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v.
Sandford.121 There, the Court determined that descendants of the
African race, enslaved or free, are not citizens of the United States.122
While this is one of the worst (and unanimously denounced) decisions
by the Supreme Court, the Court’s dicta is reflective of a change in the
judiciary’s conception of race.123 From a quantitative perspective, the
113. Id. at 266.
114. Id. at 267.
115. Id. at 267–68.
116. 41 U.S. 539, 613–14 (1842).
117. Id. at 612–13.
118. Id. at 613.
119. Id. at 612–13.
120. Id. at 613.
121. 60 U.S. 393, 403–05 (1857).
122. Id. at 425.
123. Beyond the holding, the Dred Scott decision also reveals the chilling and perva-
sive influence that politicians may have upon the Court. Incoming President James
Buchanon hoped that the Court would subdue (or at least silence) unrest in the court on
the issue of slavery, and contacted several Justices regarding the case’s developments.
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word “African” appears over thirty times in Justice Taney’s majority
opinion.124 And contrary to prior opinions that focused on the authority
of the “master” rather than the identity of the slave, Justice Taney
underscored that Dred Scott was “a negro of African descent, whose
ancestors were of pure African blood.”125 Further, he took great
pains to stress that the Constitution drew a “line of division . . .
between the citizen race, who formed and held the Government, and
the African race, which they held in subjection and slavery,”126 and
that Africans were long “regarded as beings of an inferior order, and
altogether unfit to associate with the white race.”127 Taney’s origin-
alist interpretation went on to emphasize that the Framers not only
intended to erect “a perpetual and impassable barrier” between the
African race and the white race, but also sought to impose “this
stigma, of deepest degradation . . . upon the whole race.”128
From one perspective, the Dred Scott decision portrayed race as
essential and absolute by focusing upon ancestry and blood rela-
tions.129 From another, the Court spoke of race as a deliberate con-
struction or erected barrier by the Framers.130 This attempt to
reinforce the “inferiority” of the African identity through the intent
of the Framers was ultimately nothing more than erroneous confla-
tion.131 There was nothing essential about the “African race” that
made them inferior.132 Rather, it was simply the desire of the Fram-
ers to build the nation on the backs of slaves of African descent.133
Consequently, we can see that even in 1857, the Supreme Court was
grappling to categorize racial identity in a way that seemed innate.
In spite of racism rapidly brewing in the judiciary, blacks134 were
active agents in the making of Reconstruction and did not hesitate
to seize the opportunity to “stake a claim to equal citizenship.”135 In
current climate of divisive, racially charged rhetoric by the Trump Administration on top
of partisan polarization, this sort of scenario feels all too realistic.
124. See generally Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
125. Id. at 400.
126. Id. at 420.
127. Id. at 407.
128. Id. at 409.
129. Id. at 407–08.
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some ways this was an “experiment in interracial democracy.”136 Black
political leaders artfully employed America’s “republican values” as a
means of attacking its “racial caste system.”137 However, in seeking
to form a diverse, equal opportunity nation, blacks were posing a di-
rect threat to “local autonomy” that triggered “ugly counterattacks
from advocates of white supremacy.”138 The Southern Democratic
party—the “conservative institution of the era”—trended towards “cul-
tural homogeneity,” strongly opposed black suffrage, and stigmatized
those advocating for it as dangerous fanatics.139 At the same time, the
Democrats made intense efforts to deprive blacks the right to vote.140
And as the reform movement continued to grow in size, the white
South opted for a “Reign of Terror” to disenfranchise and weaken the
political power of blacks and Republicans through intimidation.141
Ironically, by focusing upon terrorizing their political clout,
Southerners failed to deprive blacks an education.142 And so, despite
all odds, “an almost totally illiterate population” found a way to self-
educate and elevate themselves into the governmental sphere.143
During the Reconstruction Era, sixteen black legislators were elected
to Congress.144 Many of these legislators would not see another
black individual elected to office until the 1980s and 1990s—nearly
a century after Reconstruction.145 Accordingly, the legislators seized
the moment and passed the incredibly progressive Civil Rights Act
of 1875 that sought to attain equality for Blacks.146 Unsurprisingly,
the Supreme Court ruled that the Act was unconstitutional because
it was beyond the powers of Congress to reach private discrimina-
tion.147 The Court’s approach reflected the judiciary’s “general dis-
enchantment with the Reconstruction program” and echoed a long line
of decisions sweeping away efforts to elevate equality above racism.148
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at xxiv, 29–30.
139. Id. at 30–31.
140. Id.
141. W.E.B. Du Bois, Reconstruction and Its Benefits, 15 AM. HIST. REV. 781, 785 (1910).
142. Id. at 782–85.
143. Id. at 782.
144. ERIC FORNER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877,
352 n.12 (1988).
145. Id.
146. Landmark Legislation: Civil Rights Act of 1875, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate
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B. Judicial Waffling
Arguably, racial classifications are fundamentally ill-suited for
the fact-intensive evidentiary pursuits in a court of law. There is
something perverse about asking a group of predominantly white
men149 to make judgements about the oppression of racial minorities.
In 1878, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court in California refused
to accept the “Mongolian” race as white for the purposes of natural-
ization.150 In the In re Ah Yup decision, Judge Sawyer explained
that although “white person” is “a very indefinite description of a
class” and that those who are perceived as white “may be found of
every shade,” the common, well-settled meaning of a white person
is restricted to the “Caucasian race.”151 To further bolster this un-
derstanding of race, the court looked to the Webster Dictionary’s five
ethnological classifications of race that placed Mongolians within
the “yellow race.”152 Judge Sawyer then went on to underscore that
Congress “universally understood” and expressly made the decision
to retain the word “white” to exclude the Chinese from the right of
naturalization.153 Further, since Congress had recently extended
naturalization to the “African race,” the court inferred that Con-
gress was not prepared to resolve “the Chinese problem” in the face
of the foreseeable entry of millions of immigrants.154
Although Congress was deliberately racist in its intent, courts
were both hesitant and uncertain when it came to applying this
intent. Some courts were staunchly unwilling to thwart Congress.
In Ex parte Shahid, for example, Judge Smith found that “[i]t would
be most unfortunate” if the decision were to be determined by “the
conclusions of a judge based on ocular inspection.”155 As such, it would
be “safest to follow the reasonable construction of the statute as it
would appear to have been intended at the time of its passage.”156
Here, the court certainly demonstrated a great deal of deference to
Congress and rejected arguments “of the emotional ad captandum
order, that have no place in the judicial interpretation of a statute.”157
Beyond this fidelity to congressional intent, however, the court also
relied on its own understanding of race. The plaintiff was a Syrian
149. TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT
ON STATE COURTS? 7, 12 (2016).
150. In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223, 225 (D. Cal. Cir. Ct. 1878).
151. Id. at 223.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 224.
154. Id.
155. 205 F. 812, 816 (E.D.S.C. 1913).
156. Id. at 815.
157. Id.
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born in Asia Minor whose skin color Judge Smith described as “about
that of a walnut, or somewhat darker than is the usual mulatto of
one-half mixed blood between the white and the negro races.”158 The
emphasis on skin color continued as Judge Smith wondered how the
court should classify race based upon the “degree of colorization.”159
In light of “the uncertainties of shades of color” the court decided to
limit whiteness to individuals of European descent with the “con-
trolling element” being their “fair-complexioned” skin color.160 As
such, the court simultaneously equated color with race and discredited
the court’s role in determining race on the basis of color.161 In adopt-
ing this bewildering and perplexing approach to construing race, the
court further emphasized the incongruities of racial classification.162
In sharp contrast, other courts rejected racial categories that
were constructed through the political process. In the case of In re
Rodriguez, Judge Maxey held that the laws of naturalization were
applicable to Mexican citizens.163 The court did not believe that the
applicant’s fate should be determined “from the standpoint of the
ethnologist” or through “strict scientific classification of the
anthropologist.”164 Rather, the court elevated the role of a man’s “daily
walk” and his ability to honor the principles of the Constitution
through his actions.165 Unfortunately, despite the seeming progress
suggested by the In re Rodriguez decision, the reality within society
itself did not match the court’s ruling or the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo, which incorporated thousands of Mexicans into American
citizenship.166 In practice, Mexican Americans that were deemed
“white as a matter of law” experienced no corollary privilege or
status.167 Indeed, whiteness was in a state of flux as well—judges
would rule that Mexicans were “co-whites” when it favored the domi-
nant group, but “nonwhite when necessary to protect Anglo privilege
and supremacy.”168 In this sense, the law continually reinforced the
privileges of the “white race” and left individuals grappling to find
ways to qualify.
158. Id. at 813.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 814–15.
161. Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. at 814–16.
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C. Recognizing the Power of Perception
Throughout the early and mid-1900s, courts were continually
vexed by the task of construing race within the statutory frame-
works that Congress had enacted. But, by the end of the twentieth
century, delivering the protections within Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act became the next frontier for the judiciary.169 Under Title
VII’s broad ambit, it is unlawful for employers to discriminate
against or limit, segregate, or classify an individual on the basis of
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”170 However, although
race, color, and national origin are protected classes, the legislative
history of the Act indicates that Congress was primarily focused on
the “binary distinction between Black and White,” and intended Afri-
can Americans as the beneficiaries.171 Further, there is no guidance
for interpreting who qualifies under the “color protected class,”172
which effectively delegates the issue to the whims of external per-
ceptions and courts with no direction.
The 1994 case of Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities173
provides an illustrative example of the role of external perception in
race and the courts overarching confusion about its authority in
determining race.174 In Perkins, the plaintiff filed a Title VII claim
of disparate treatment because of his American Indian race. He was
regularly subjected to derogatory comments and names regarding
his race and was denied numerous opportunities to be promoted or
apply for promotion.175 As litigation unfolded, the defendant-employer
sought to undermine the plaintiff’s claims by arguing that Perkins
was not truly an American Indian and therefore could not make a
claim under Title VII.176 To do so, the defendant conducted “exhaus-
tive research” on ancestry and race through birth records and docu-
mentation from the U.S. Census and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.177
The U.S. Census revealed that after the 1830 Census where the
Perkins family listed itself as “Free Colored,” it began to list itself
as “Mulatto.”178 Further, in the genealogical researcher’s opinion,
Perkins had “no provable ancestral ties to any of the recognized Indian
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
170. Id.
171. Kate Sablosky Elengold, Branding Identity, 93 DENV. L. REV. 1, 9 (2015).
172. Id. at 7, 13–15.
173. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dept. of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1277–78 (N.D. Ohio
1994).
174. Id. at 1263.
175. Id. at 1264.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1266.
178. Id. at 1267.
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Nations” and possessed “less than one sixteenth Indian blood.”179
Thus, the defendant maintained, Perkins had failed to demonstrate
“any perceptible degree of Indian blood” and could not qualify as a
member of a protected class under Title VII.180
Despite ambiguities in his ancestry, Perkins’ lived experience
cut in the opposite direction. His family was regarded as being of
American Indian heritage, his father “publicly claimed” this heri-
tage, Perkins was called “Redbone” in a derogatory manner, and he
always held himself out to be an American Indian.181 There was
testimony that Perkins “looked Indian” because of his “facial struc-
ture” and “complexion.”182 Moreover, his employer and co-workers
perceived him as an American Indian, and the employer’s records
indicated that he was an American Indian.183 The court in Perkins
acknowledged that classifying an individual on the basis of race “is
deceptively complex” and “complicated first by the amorphous defi-
nition of the term ‘race,’ and second by the difficulty of categorizing
individuals with varied and/or unclear ancestry within a particular
racial grouping.”184 Additionally, the court was reluctant to endorse
racial classifications because they have traditionally been “used to
justify the exploitation of certain groups,” and have been reconfig-
ured by social scientists so many times “that the very notion of ‘race’
may be deemed illusory.”185 Ultimately, since Title VII was intended
to “equalize rather than separate,” the court concluded that Perkins
was entitled to the statutory protections.186
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court has underscored that because
there is no one formula or definitive test to determine race, “com-
mon understanding” governs.187 The Supreme Court has relied upon
the research findings of biologists and anthropologists to recognize
that race is “for the most part sociopolitical, rather than biological, in
nature” and “[c]lear-cut categories do not exist.”188 Unsurprisingly,
lower courts continue to struggle in applying the seeming arbitrari-
ness of racial classification to “our heterogeneous society.”189 In
179. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1269.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1270.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1271.
185. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1271.
186. Id. at 1276 (“Title VII does not single out Indians for special benefits or treat-
ment, but, rather, attempts to equalize the position of all employees . . . .”).
187. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 86 (1934).
188. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987).
189. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 316 n.39 (1987); see also Budinsky v.
Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (“The terms ‘race’ and ‘racial
discrimination’ may be of such doubtful sociological validity as to be scientifically
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particular, when a court is tasked with distinguishing between race
and national origin, judges begin to question their authority, ponder-
ing whether courts should “be in the business of ‘certifying’ blood-
lines and races.”190 Ultimately, courts have settled upon the view that
race is a dynamic (rather than static) category that “lives and changes
according to popular beliefs.”191 Yet, because of the spectrum-like
fluidity across race, color, and national origin, courts continue to
return to the binary of white and non-white in rooting their analy-
sis.192 What thereby emerges is the centrality of external perception
with regards to racial classifications.
III. MITIGATING THE BATTLE BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND IDENTITY
Appearance is often not reality, but merely a façade. Yet, if
one’s “street-race”—how others perceive your race on the street—
supersedes one’s self-identified race, then the external perception
becomes reality.193 A key component in this dissonance is the notion
of “racial fluidity,” which encompasses “the belief that race, like
gender, is a choice, not a biological identity you’re assigned at birth.”194
Individuals that view themselves as racially fluid outright reject the
concept of being categorized by race, and instead develop their own
racial identities.195 Even though sex has a greater biological basis
than race, society is far more comfortable accepting that we can
choose our gender than our race.196 Nevertheless, racial identities
are becoming increasingly mixed and viewed as something that is
imbued with choice rather than something we are inherently as-
signed at birth.197 At the core of fluidity is the recognition that broad
sweeping categories (like “Latino”) fail to capture the immense di-
versity within the group and give rise to problematic (and poten-
tially dangerous) misunderstandings of national origin, ethnicity,
meaningless, but these terms nonetheless are subject to a commonly-accepted, albeit
sometimes vague, understanding.”).
190. Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 559 n.16 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
191. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dept. of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1272 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
192. Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Engineering, 597 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979).
193. Nancy Lopez, Edward Vargas, Melina Juarez, Lisa Cacari-Stone & Sonia Bettez,
What’s Your “Street Race”? Leveraging Multidimensional Measures of Race and Inter-
sectionality for Examining Physical and Mental Health Status Among Latinxs, 4 SOC.
RACE & ETHNICITY 49, 49–51 (2017).
194. John Blake, The Blurring of Racial Lines Won’t Save America. Why ‘Racial
Fluidity’ is a Con, CNN (June 11, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/02/us/racial-flu
idity/index.html [https://perma.cc/5HBX-XFZC].
195. Id.
196. See ROGERS BRUBAKER, TRANS: GENDER AND RACE IN AN AGE OF UNSETTLED
IDENTITIES 18–19 (2016).
197. See id. at 50–56.
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and culture.198 Therefore, as the United States trends towards be-
coming a minority white population, the nation—from its judiciary
to its populace—must look critically at its incomplete understanding
and assumptions of race.
A. Choosing a Racial Identity
For all the controversy surrounding her, Rachel Dolezal pres-
ents a staunch example of racial fluidity and the myriad of chal-
lenges it presents in the U.S. consciousness. Rachel identified as an
African-American woman and served as the president of the NAACP
in Spokane, Washington before being “outed” by her biological
parents as white.199 This led to public outcry as she was accused of
belittling and appropriating the struggles of African Americans by
pretending to be black while lacking the ancestry and lived experi-
ence.200 In particular, Rachel was mercilessly condemned for not
acknowledging that her biological parents were white. While this
response was understandable, particularly with respect the lawsuit
she filed against Howard University for creating “a racially hostile
environment because she was white,”201 it left unresolved the viabil-
ity of being “transracial” in America.202
Rachel grew up immersed in a family with four adopted black
siblings and was always interested in ethnicity and diversity.203
After college, she attended Howard University to pursue her passion
for art—specifically, African-American portraiture.204 There, she
began to transform and take on the racial identity she maintains
today.205 To be clear, Rachel has privileges afforded to her by virtue
of her light-skinned complexion as well as her ability to “pass” as
white.206 In the context of the racial hierarchy, Rachel’s whiteness
allows her greater social and economic mobility than non-white
198. RACE AND RACES, supra note 15, at 374 (noting that the aggression and animosity
against undocumented immigrants leaves countless citizens at risk of violence solely
because of their racial identity).
199. Matthew Haag, Rachel Dolezal, Who Pretended To Be Black, Is Charged With
Welfare Fraud, CNN (May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/us/rachel-dole
zal-welfare-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/66XR-MUGU].
200. See Khaled A. Beydoun & Erika K. Wilson, Reverse Passing, 64 UCLA L. REV.
282, 286 (2017).
201. Id.
202. Faith Karimi, Rachel Dolezal, White Woman Who Portrayed Herself as Black,
Accused of Welfare Fraud, CNN (May 25, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/25/us/rachel
-dolezal-welfare-fraud-allegations/index.html [https://perma.cc/M77B-9QAA].
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individuals.207 While Rachel’s lawsuit against Howard University
may point towards a shift in the hierarchy because of the incentives
of affirmative action, her life after college suggests a different con-
clusion.208 Much of Rachel’s adult life has been lived as light-skinned
black woman serving the African-American community.209 During
her tenure with the NAACP, she fought against pervasive racism
and police brutality in Spokane—a city in which its state represen-
tative was reelected after distributing a document calling for the
death of all non-Christian males.210
Undeniably, Rachel made numerous missteps in her period of
transition,211 chief among which was not being more honest about
her past. That said, Rachel’s oppressive childhood sheds light on why
she sought to relinquish all ties to her biological parents and assign-
ment to whiteness at birth.212 Two of Rachel’s adopted African-
American siblings, Esther and Izaiah Dolezal, attested to the fact
that their parents raised them to be white.213 In response, Rachel
took it upon herself to “bridge the cultural divide” to empathize with
her siblings—something she says, “spoke to her soul.”214 Esther also
recounted how their parents would spank the children with a glue-
gun stick and a black baboon whip so intensely that they left scars
visible upon them to this day.215 Upon seeing the deep scars on
Izaiah’s back, Rachel felt she had to sever any connection to her
parents.216 From a psychological perspective, one can understand why
Rachel sought to dissociate herself from her family and begin a
journey of self-discovery and “becoming” through the years. In some
ways, Rachel’s transition in her racial identity can be viewed as a
207. Tanya Kateri Hernandez, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in an
Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 118 (1998).
208. Beydoun & Wilson, supra note 200, at 289.
209. Ray Sanchez & Ben Brumfield, Rachel Dolezal’s Appearance is ‘Blackface,’
Brother Says, CNN (June 15, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/13/us/washington
-rachel-dolezal-adopted-brother/index.html [https://perma.cc/8AXM-6ATQ].
210. Id.; Owen Daugherty, GOP State Legislator who Called for ‘War’ Against Enemies
of Christianity Wins Reelection, THE HILL (Nov. 7, 2018), https://thehill.com/blogs/ballot
-box/415595-gop-state-lawmaker-who-published-manifesto-calling-for-war-against-ene
mies [https://perma.cc/UZZ6-E6FG].
211. See, e.g., Susan Svrluga, Rachel Dolezal Sued Howard for Racial Discrimination.
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performance, but in others, it can simply be regarded as an evolu-
tion of self-identity—a delicate dance between perception and the
power to choose.
B. Taking One Small Step in a Delicate Dance
Racial fluidity presents challenges for both data collection and
advocacy efforts. Studies of affirmative action programs and racial
discrimination in the workplace are contingent on having statistics
that fully encapsulate and reflect the disparity.217 Therefore, if
individuals that are perceived as black in the workplace (and dis-
criminated as such) report themselves as multiracial or racially
fluid, then the statistics are disaggregated and likely diluted. Like-
wise, if individuals that are perceived as white begin to report them-
selves as a minority race for purposes of affirmative action, then the
underlying aims of social justice efforts begin to decay.
At the core of the tension between self-identity and external
perception are two intriguing developments in the law and society.
First, the judiciary’s ongoing belittlement of “colorism”218 claims within
the Title VII employment discrimination framework has diminished
the role of external perception in the context of discrimination. And
second, the popularity of DNA ancestry tests has resulted in a per-
verse sense of empowerment to adopt new racial identities without
considering the privilege of being able to do so.219 Together, these
two developments suggest that there is a need to differentiate between
self-identity and external perception in the U.S. Census Survey to
better understand the populace and its lived experience.
Research has continually underscored the disparate effect of
skin tone on employment outcomes. For instance, despite having
higher levels of education and prior work experience, darker-skinned
African-American males are “significantly less preferred” to lighter-
skinned African-American males with less education and experi-
ence.220 In addition, empirical research has found that the majority
217. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial Identity with
Equal Protection, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2014); see also Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 339–41 (1977) (holding that statistics can prove a prima facie case
of racial discrimination).
218. “Colorism,” a term coined by Alice Walker, is the “prejudicial or preferential
treatment of same-race people based solely on their color.” ALICE WALKER, If the Present
Looks Like the Past, What Does the Future Look Like? (1982), in IN SEARCH OF OUR
MOTHER’S GARDEN 290, 290–91 (1983).
219. Wendy B. Roth & Biorn Ivemark, Genetic Options: The Impact of Genetic Ancestry
Testing on Consumers’ Racial and Ethnic Identities, 124 AM. J. SOC. 150, 169–75 (2018).
220. Tennille McCray, Coloring Inside the Lines: Finding a Solution for Workplace
Colorism Claims, 30 L. & INEQUALITY 149, 149 (2012).
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of African Americans in positions of authority are generally lighter-
skinned.221 Yet, despite the empirical data (and lived experiences of
darker-skinned racial minorities), courts have largely ignored claims
of colorism and focused instead on racial discrimination.222 This ne-
glect is problematic because color is often used to discriminate against
individuals—both between and within races on the racial hierarchy—
regardless of their actual categorization on the basis of race.223
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act expressly carves out “color” as
a protected class (on par with race and national origin) in employ-
ment discrimination.224 Nevertheless, courts have consistently as-
sessed color and race claims as though they were one and the same,
and in effect rendered color claims superfluous.225 In doing so, courts
fail to protect individuals from the insidiousness of colorism and fail
to understand the interaction effect between race and color.226
Alternatively, a court could adopt a holistic and nuanced test that
would: (1) acknowledge the independent role of skin color within
discrimination; and (2) recognize its compounding function when
presented alongside of evidence of national origin and race discrimi-
nation.227 While courts have notoriously fumbled with “intersectional
claims”228 under Title VII, the stakes are simply too high to continue
analyzing color, race, and national origin in silos. Put simply, the
judiciary must take note of the compounding effects of intersectional
discrimination, and give credence to the power of external percep-
tion in discrimination.
221. Verna M. Keith & Cedric Herring, Skin Tone and Stratification in the Black
Community, 97 AM. J. SOC. 760, 777 (1991).
222. Id. at 775–77; see also SHADES OF DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS 213,
217 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., 2009).
223. Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L. J. 1487, 1490
(2000); see also supra Parts I and II for historical context and the judiciary’s inconsistent
approach to categorizing race.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Arguably, Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
also impliedly affords protection from private and public employment discrimination. See
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994) (“All persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”); Jordan v. Whelan Sec. of Ill., Inc.,
30 F. Supp. 3d 746, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“[L]ower courts have held that § 1981 does
recognize discrimination claims based on a person’s color.”).
225. Jones, supra note 223, at 1537–38.
226. See id.
227. This Article does not purport to develop a new framework under Title VII, but
simply proposes a different way of viewing intersectional claims in the context of race.
228. Intersectional claims arise in cases wherein a single element (sex, for example)
is insufficient to bring a claim, but two elements together (such as sex and race) rise to
the requisite level of discrimination. See id. at 1551 n.256. While some courts have rec-
ognized the theory of intersectionality, others have rejected it altogether. See, e.g.,
DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
(finding that Title VII’s was not to create a new class of “black women”).
2020] FLEXIBLY FLUID & IMMUTABLY INNATE 553
Today, the fluidity of race is further complicated by the advent
of DNA ancestry tests, such as 23andMe,229 that purport to reveal
ethnicity through genetics despite there being no scientific or statis-
tical difference across the genomes of all humans.230 The results of
these DNA ancestry tests typically inform an individual that they
are a mixture of ethnicities with ties to European, Asian, and Afri-
can countries.231 Thereby creating the impression that ethnicity can
be expressed as a statistical comparison to the DNA of natives in
the geographic regions.232 Beyond being nonsensical, ancestry tests
conflate heritage with ethnicity and edge individuals closer to
viewing race as being biologically rooted in our DNA—a notion that
has been revoked decades ago.233 The effect of DNA ancestry tests
may have perverse effects on U.S. Census statistics and ultimately
result in an underestimate of racial inequities. A recent research
study found that individuals tend to selectively embrace certain
aspects of the ancestry tests results as part of their racial identity.234
Further, over eighty percent of those that “adopted geneticized
racial identities,” documented the change within the census.235 Most
problematically, white respondents expressed excitement about “try-
ing on” their new identities236 as though they were temporary cos-
tumes, which reinforces a fundamental misunderstanding of race and
the permanent consequences that it bears for non-white individuals.
In addition to the judicial misunderstanding of colorism and the
perverse effects of geneticized racial identity, the U.S. Census
continues to fall dramatically short by asking the wrong questions.
When it comes to surveys and statistics, it is particularly important
to study race in the context of power and remain cognizant of poten-
tial biases within the governing perspective.237 If the perspective
originates within a dominant group, it may well be reinforcing “a
form of shared reality in which its own superior position is seen as
natural.”238 As such, it is crucial that when conducting a census sur-
vey, the right questions are asked for the right reasons.
229. 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/?myg=true [https://perma.cc/N6KX-5YGG]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
230. See Kolbert, supra note 30.
231. See 23ANDME, supra note 229.
232. John Edward Terrell, Ancestry Tests Pose a Threat to Our Social Fabric, SAPIENS
(Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.sapiens.org/technology/dna-test-ethnicity [https:/perma.cc
/5QVP-23YW].
233. See id.
234. Roth & Ivemark, supra note 219, at 152.
235. Id. at 165.
236. Id. at 169–75.
237. See, e.g., Lopez et al., supra note 193, at 55–61.
238. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionist and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (1989).
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Though it may appear that the U.S. Census is not a topic of
controversy in the law, in April of 2019, the Supreme Court heard
oral arguments to resolve whether the Department of Commerce
could reinstate a question inquiring into citizenship status in the
2020 Census.239 The effects of this single question are far reaching.
The government’s analysis indicates that approximately 6.5 million
people (primarily undocumented or Hispanic immigrants) will not
respond to the census, which would therefore reduce federal funding
and the number of seats in the House of Representatives.240 Given
the immense implications of each question on the census, the ut-
most care should be taken in determining how and why particular
inquiries are made.
At present, the U.S. Census Bureau simply asks each individual
to report their race, noting that this is “based on self-identification
and generally reflects a social definition of race” as opposed to one
that is genetic or biological.241 On its face this definition appears to
be adequate, but it actually creates challenges for a large swath of
minority groups. For instance, there is no category on the race ques-
tion for those who would identify as Latino or Hispanic.242 On one
hand, expanding the number of race combination groups in the
census may not be an adequate solution as this approach compli-
cates the data analysis process.243 On the other, attempting to group
diverse identities into broad umbrella terms fails to account for the
array of meaningful differences across subgroups.
The broader issue is that the very question of choosing a race is
limiting because it does not take into account the individual’s daily
realities regardless of how they may self-identify. Empirical evi-
dence reveals that one’s “street race” is a strong measure of race in
exploring the inequality and racialization experience across individ-
uals within minority groups.244 Nonetheless, the census continues
239. See Department of Commerce v. New York, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog
.com/case-files/cases/department-of-commerce-v-new-york [https://perma.cc/G37N-M6
UF] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). At the time that this Article was written, the Supreme
Court had heard oral arguments for the case but had not yet issued its decision. Id.
240. Amy Howe, Justices will Review Challenge to Census Citizenship Question: In
Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/04/justices
-will-review-challenge-to-census-citizenship-question-in-plain-english/ [https://perma.cc
/R26D-WRWZ].
241. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUESTIONS PLANNED FOR THE 2020 CENSUS AND AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY 11–12 (2018), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decenni
al/2020/operations/planned-questions-2020-acs.pdf.
242. Id. at 9.
243. See Nancy Lopez, The US Census Bureau Keeps Confusing Race and Ethnicity,
CONVERSATION (Feb. 28, 2018), http://theconversation.com/the-us-census-bureau-keeps
-confusing-race-and-ethnicity-89649 [https://perma.cc/RG4T-427V].
244. See, e.g., Montalvo Frank & Codia G Edward, Skin Color and Latinos in the
United States, 1 ETHNICITIES 321, 333–35 (2001); Lopez et al., supra note 193, at 50.
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to confuse race and ethnicity, and has been resistant to change.245
The 2020 Census, for example, will retain the same outdated ethnic
and racial categories that it used in 2010.246 As demographics con-
tinue to shift and new identities develop, it is perplexing that “some
other race” remains the third-largest racial group.247
All of us, no matter our race, know the feeling of having some-
thing integral to our personhood that the external world either does
not perceive or perceives differently. So, why not make something
of the dissonance between our personal identity and the external
world’s perception? This Article proposes that the U.S. Census
Survey ask individuals both what race they personally identify with
and what race they are perceived as. This would allow individuals
to express not only how they are externally classified on the basis of
their lived experience, but also how their racial identity may transi-
tion over time. Moreover, given the strong correlation between
street race and both discrimination and economic disparity, this
solution would provide data on a nationwide level that has never
before existed. Ultimately, this small change in how statistics are
collected has the potential to make implicit assumptions about race
explicit and extend legal protections far beyond their current reach.
CONCLUSION
As the United States becomes increasingly diverse and fraught
with tensions across racial divides, the nation cannot proceed with an
incomplete understanding of race. Whether Jewish or African Amer-
ican, the construction of race and the racial hierarchy has continued
to exert toxic effects upon minorities. This Article strives to remedy
some of the pervasive ignorance at the intersection of racial identity
and external perception, and to identify the interaction effects be-
tween and across the multitude of categories, labels, and groups that
comprise an individual’s identity within the legal system. An individ-
ual’s identity is not always in alignment with the world’s perception,
and the variance between the two poses a fundamental challenge to
how American law has historically categorized and conceived of race.
Ultimately, the path forward requires an increased empathy and
understanding of our diverse nation. To do so, we must first begin
by asking the right questions.
245. See Lopez et al., supra note 193.
246. Hansi Lo Wang, 2020 Census To Keep Racial, Ethnic Categories Used In 2010,
NPR (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/26/580865378/census-request-suggests
-no-race-ethnicity-data-changes-in-2020-experts-say [https://perma.cc/N4F6-UTT5].
247. Id.
